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Why trying to keep the Germans close 
on EU competences is risky for Britain 
Almut Möller 
f Britain is to be successful in winning over Germany on EU reform, then it needs to understand 
how Germany’s federal system, with its intricate balance  of competences between the  various 
levels, is an integral part of modern Germany and key to German thinking on Europe. 
On 3 October 2013, Germans once again commemorated their country’s unification. Perhaps to the 
surprise  of  outsiders, the  official  celebration  was not held at the  Brandenburg Gate in the  capital 
Berlin, the powerful symbol of the peaceful revolution in 1989. Instead, President Joachim Gauck and 
Chancellor Angela Merkel together with dignitaries and citizens from across the country were hosted 
by  the  minister  president  of  the  federal  state  of  Baden-Württemberg,  one  of  Germany’s  southern 
economic powerhouses. 
Interestingly,  Winfried  Kretschmann,  the  first  Green  minister  president  ever  to  lead  Baden-
Württemberg, and then also the president of the Bundesrat, the legislative chamber where the federal 
states assemble, used his welcome speech not only to evoke the memory of German reunification, but 
to talk about Germany’s federal order. Time was not abundant, with a slot of 10 minutes or so given to 
the host before the German President took the stage (whose speech makes for a most interesting read 
for  Germany’s  partners  in  Europe  and  elsewhere).  Minister  President  Kretschmann  reminded  his 
audience and those in the country watching and listening that it was an ongoing task for politicians to 
figure out the right balance between the central power of the federal government and the rights of the 
federal states. Who does what – and who pays for what? 
Why do I make this point? Talking about the balance of competences in this decentralised state has an 
important place in the German mainstream political discourse. It has such an important place that the 
minister  president  felt  his  short  time  was  best  used  by  addressing  this  very  issue  on  Germany’s 
national holiday. Talking about ‘competences’ is a perfectly normal pastime for politicians, especially 
in the federal states. And it is a subject of often fierce controversy. The German public has grown used 
to (and a bit tired of) hearing of yet another commission convened to disentangle the messy mix of 
competences;  of  wealthy  federal  states  accusing  the  less-affluent  ones  of  bad  management  and 
threatening to cut subsidies; and of different educational systems making mobility sometimes difficult 
and unattractive for families. 
The European Union, then, has added yet another layer to the German balance of competence debate. 
So much so that the German federal states successfully fought for the introduction of an article into the 
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German Constitution in the early 1990s that gave them a clear say in Berlin’s European policies and 
the further integration of Germany into the European Union. A decade later, during the European 
Convention  in 2002-03, the German federal states led the debate  over  introducing a catalogue  of 
abstract competences similar to the German Constitution into the EU treaties. With the Lisbon Treaty, 
these  areas  of  exclusive,  shared,  supporting,  supplementing  and  coordinating  competences  have 
become part of the European Union’s legal order. 
Needless to say that, both within Germany and with regard to the Europeanisation of its federal order, 
the question of how to find the right balance in this multi-level system is far from being resolved. 
Governments,  parliaments  or  constitutional  courts  frequently  address  the  principle  of  subsidiarity, 
which gives the level of government suited best the right to legislate. For Germans, proposals for the 
future  of Europe  can  often  only  hope to secure political support if they  include  discussion about 
competences or federalism (which for Germans means decentralisation and therefore has an overall 
positive connotation). Germans don’t love competence debates as they can be messy, but they are 
more  than  accustomed  to  engaging  in  them.  The  level  of  knowledge  about  competences  in  this 
country, with its history of a patchwork of fiefdoms until it became a unified state as late as 1871, is 
something to keep in mind for those trying to understand the European Union’s competence order. 
Indeed David Cameron did reach out to other EU capitals when the balance of competence review was 
launched – but Berlin drew the shutters down. It is not difficult to understand why. While there is 
indeed a great deal of expertise here and Germany in general is open to debating competences, the 
British competence agenda is considered an  exercise driven by  mere self-interest with the aim  of 
putting together a shopping list for London’s desires to renegotiate its relationship with the EU. 
Germany’s understanding of EU competences, however, has always been part of a wider EU reform 
agenda. While the UK government has been trying to demonstrate since the prime minister’s speech in 
January 2013 that it does have a wider agenda – competitiveness, deregulation, democracy, to name 
the most important pillars – this is not how London’s motivations are understood. Instead the British 
debate is seen as merely driven by domestic concerns – which German policy-makers have stated they 
cannot and do not want to interfere with. 
Recently there has been speculation in the British press prompted by an interview that Chancellor 
Merkel gave 13 August 2013 in which she talked about eurozone reform and the future institutional 
order of the EU. Despite the then ongoing federal election campaign, this hour-long summer interview 
was  largely  ignored  in  Germany.  British commentary,  however,  found  it  to  be  evidence  of  the 
‘Britishisation’ of Germany’s EU agenda. The fact that the Chancellor spoke about “competences” 
was  taken  as  proof  that  David  Cameron’s  speech  had  made  a  connection  with  the  Chancellor’s 
thinking! And, so goes the spin, other parts of Europe, notably the Dutch, had also been recruited to 
the cause. These signals were taken as clear signs that London is making progress in beginning a 
process  that  it  vitally  needs  if  it  is  to  have  a  chance  to  re-negotiate  the  balance  of  powers  with 
Brussels. 
From Berlin’s perspective, this looks rather different. So what did the German Chancellor actually 
say? The competence question was part of a wider conversation on the reform of the European Union. 
The Lisbon Treaty, Angela Merkel said, gave the European Parliament a lot more competences, which 
was, she stressed, “the right thing to do”. But then, she continued, there needed to be a debate in the 
run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2014 about the right balance of competences within the 
Union.  How  many  competences  still  needed  to  be  transferred  to  Brussels?  Might  one  envisage  a 
situation  in  which  competences  were  even  transferred  back  (“Was  wird  man  in  Zukunft  noch  an 
Kompetenzen nach Europa geben, kann man vielleicht auch eines Tages etwas zurückgeben”)? This 
phrase quite naturally grabbed the attention of British analysts. 
Why did Angela Merkel make this point? It is very likely that in a tactical move she was addressing 
voters of the Bavarian sister party of her CDU as well as potential voters of the new “Alternative for 
Germany” party. Bavaria, with its successive Conservative governments, has always kept a close eye 
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away from the federal government in Berlin. And Bavaria was crucial for Angela Merkel’s future as 
Chancellor. Bavaria held elections just one week before the general elections (and thus only a few 
weeks after the interview was broadcast). The German media largely ignored the competence remark 
in the days that followed, and those listening to the interview perhaps did not find it an unusual topic 
to address anyway – why not, in a recurrent “who does what debate” they are so used to hearing. 
With Angela Merkel winning the September 2013 general elections, are we now in for a big leap 
towards competence reform? It is unlikely that the next coalition government will pick up the issue 
and turn it into the kind of policy that might help London link it to its own balance of competence 
review and the short-term aim of renegotiating powers. It is however likely that the next government 
will entertain some thinking and a willingness to talk about the issue as part of a wider and longer-
term vision for EU reform. As explained above, this is almost mandatory in the German context. In 
London, however, the issue is of relevance for the current government’s short-term political survival 
and Britain’s EU membership. 
Britain should know that trying to keep the Germans close to its bosom on the competence question is 
risky in two ways. First, Berlin might get annoyed by London going too far not only with its own EU 
ambitions, but in trying to manipulate public perceptions of Berlin to serve its own agenda. London 
should  not  forget  the  reasons  that  led  Berlin  to  turn  down  the  invitation  to  get  involved  in  the 
evidence-gathering exercise for the UK’s balance of competence review. Second, and perhaps more 
risky, is the possibility that such commentary might provoke some of Germany’s leaders to speak out 
on the competence question and make it clear in the first place that London certainly does not possess 
the authority or the credibility to frame the debate in this area. There is a German competence debate, 
but it is a very  different one. It  has strong roots  in  the political culture  of the country, it  has  an 
accepted European dimension and it has always been part of a comprehensive debate on EU reform, 
which most likely runs counter to London’s ambitions. Those suggesting that Berlin is with London on 
the competence question might want to be careful about what they wish for. About EPIN 
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